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Abstract 
It is still debated whether holistic or piecemeal transformation is applied to carry out 
mental rotation (MR), as an aspect of visual imagery. It has been recently argued that 
various mental representations could be flexibly generated in order to perform MR 
tasks. To test the hypothesis that imagery ability and the types of stimuli interact to 
affect the format of representation and the choice of strategy in performing MR task, 
participants, grouped as good or poor imagers, were assessed using four MR tasks, 
comprising two sets of ‘Standard’ cube figures and two sets of ‘non-Standard’ ones, 
designed by withdrawing cubes from the Standard ones. Both good and poor imagers 
performed similarly under the two Standard conditions. Under non-Standard 
conditions, good imagers performed much faster in non-Standard objects than Standard 
ones, whereas poor imagers performed much slower in non-Standard objects than 
Standard ones. These results suggested that 1) individuals did not differ in processing 
the integrated Standard object; whereas 2) in processing the non-Standard objects, 
various visual representations and strategies could be applied in MR by diverse 
individuals: good imagers were more flexible in generating different visual 
representations; whereas poor imagers applied different strategies under different task 
demands. 
Keywords: visual imagery; mental rotation; individual difference; visual representation; 
strategy 
  
  
 
 
Introduction 
Mental rotation (MR) is an aspect of visual imagery. Typically, in MR tasks, participants are 
asked to compare a pair of arm-like cube objects rotated in three-dimensional space relative 
to one another and to determine whether they are the same objects in different orientations or 
mirrored ones (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). A series of studies showed that the response times 
(RTs) linearly increase with the angular disparity. This suggests a dynamic imagery process 
akin to the actual physical rotation, which has been accounted for assuming that MR relies on 
visual representation. This theoretical stance is known as holistic (Cooper & Shepard, 1973; 
Metzler & Shepard, 1974). However, this inference derived merely from the linearly 
increment of the RTs has been challenged (Pylyshyn, 1973; Pylyshyn, 1981) and the process 
of piecemeal transformation was proposed instead, to account for MR. In contrast to the 
holistic theory, piecemeal transformation posits an analytical process that transforms the 
object feature-by-feature or piece-by-piece. 
The question of whether holistic or piecemeal transformation underlies MR 
processing is part of the long-standing “imagery debate” on whether visual experience plays a 
functional role in cognition (e.g., Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006) or is just an 
epiphenomenon (Pylyshyn, 1981). Comparing these two theoretical accounts of MR, Cooper 
(1975) postulated that in processing more complex objects, piecemeal transformation would 
show a steeper slope in RTs as a function of angular disparity in which the slope is assumed 
to reflect the MR rate and the intercept reflects the process of stimuli encoding and of giving 
response (Cooper & Shepard, 1973; Just & Carpenter, 1976, 1985). As the complexity of the 
internal representation increases, more time is needed to replace the features/nodes and the 
spatial networks among these features/nodes during MR processing in piecemeal 
  
 
 
transformation. However, in holistic processing the internal representation is maintained and 
manipulated as a whole regardless of its complexity. In this context, piecemeal could be 
distinguished from holistic by predicting an increment of MR rate with the increasing 
stimulus complexity. Hence, the complexity effect was suggested as an indicator for 
distinguishing between the two strategies (piecemeal or holistic) proposed to account for MR. 
To test this complexity effect hypothesis in piecemeal transformation, Cooper and Podgorny 
(1976) used 2D polygons as their stimuli with different complexity levels manipulated by the 
number of vertices (Attneave & Arnoult, 1956). No effect of complexity was observed in this 
experiment, supporting the idea that an holistic strategy was at play. Some other researchers, 
however, did observe this complexity effect by replicating Cooper and Podgorny’s 
experiment (1976) using polygons (Folk & Luce, 1987) or 3D cube figures as stimuli 
(Bethell-Fox & Shepard, 1988; Yuille & Steiger, 1982), hence, supporting the piecemeal 
transformation hypothesis.  
It has been argued that failure to generate the complete image in internal representations 
leads to the lack of the complexity effect even if piecemeal transformation is at play (e.g., 
Cooper & Podgorny, 1976; Folk & Luce, 1987). It has been posited that participants have the 
ability to maintain a simplified representation of the stimuli rather than the whole image in 
their mind’s eye and rotate this precise representation holistically (Liesefeld & Zimmer, 2013), 
especially when the stimuli are complex (Yuille & Steiger, 1982). Such precise representations 
permit a faster MR rate and result in a shallower RTs slope (Mumaw, Pellegrino, Kail & Carter, 
1984; Yuille & Steiger, 1982). 
The different methods of manipulating stimulus complexity is another possible reason 
for the inconsistent results gleaned from the literature. Two methods were used to manipulate 
  
 
 
the stimulus complexity: 1) the number of components of an integrated object, like the number 
of vertices in polygons (e.g., triangles, polygons with 6, 9, 12 points; Cooper, 1975; Cooper & 
Podgorny, 1976; Folk & Luce, 1987) or the number of shaded squares in matrices (Bethell-Fox 
& Shepard, 1988); 2) the number of perceptually distinct pieces, like the figure patterns (1, 2, 
or 3 pieces) in matrices (Bethell-Fox & Shepard, 1988; Podgnory & Shepard, 1983) or the 
number of segments in Shepard and Metzler’s (1971) typical cube figures (Yuille & Steiger, 
1982). The lack of the effect was mostly observed when complexity was manipulated within 
one integrated object (e.g., Cooper, 1975; Cooper & Podgnory, 1976); it has been indicated 
that participants are more likely to operate piecemeal transformation in processing the stimuli 
consisting of several parts (Bethell-Fox & Shepard, 1988).  
Recently, individual differences were observed in MR performance. This may be a 
way to reconcile the two theoretical accounts of MR by using the complexity effect to 
distinguish the two strategies. Different individuals appear to use different strategies to solve 
the MR tasks (Paivio, 1971; Kirby, Moore & Schofield, 1988). In particular, high-spatial 
ability individuals were faster in encoding the stimuli as well as in manipulating their visual 
representations (Mumaw et al., 1984). Low-spatial ability individuals could not keep a 
sufficiently stable representation to be operated upon holistically (Just & Carpenter, 1976).   
Bethell-Fox and Shepard (1988) maintained that the strategy choice is flexible for 
individual participants according to stimuli familiarity. In their study, no individual 
differences were found for novel objects. However, according to the participants’ debriefing, 
high-spatial ability individuals swapped their strategy to holistic, when the stimuli were well-
learned after sufficient practice and their RTs dropped rapidly. On the other hand, low 
spatial-ability individuals reported being unable to disengage from piecemeal transformation, 
  
 
 
and their RTs remained virtually the same before and after practice.  
Different MR performances were also observed across individuals under different task 
demands. Khooshabeh et al. (2013) used integrated and fragmented objects to assess high- 
and low-spatial ability individuals. High-spatial ability individuals adapted to task demand, 
using holistic strategy in processing integrated objects but applying piecemeal transformation 
when mentally rotating fragmented objects thus showing a steeper slope in fragmented 
stimuli than integrated ones. Low-spatial ability individuals showed similar performance in 
fragmented and integrated blocks, suggesting that they used piecemeal transformation for 
both fragmented and integrated objects.  
Additionally, the representation of the stimuli as one sub-stage in MR processing has 
been suggested as fundamental to spatial ability, the representation ability contributed to the 
individual differences in MR (Mumaw, et al., 1984). Longer RTs and more individual 
differences were observed in encoding, comparing and rotating unfamiliar objects in Mumaw 
et al.’s study (1984). They postulated that high-spatial ability individuals could maintain a more 
accurate representation in further mental manipulation so that they performed more accurately 
and faster in rotating unfamiliar objects, a process in which long-term memory representation 
is not required.  
Differential performances in MR were reported more recently across individuals with 
different level of vividness of visual imagery. A good example of the possible use of 
strategies to address MR is the case of MX, a 65-year-old man who reported the sudden loss 
of the ability to generate visual images. Although he showed poor vividness in visual 
imagery, he performed normally on a wide range of mental imagery tasks and other cognitive 
tasks, except on MR assessed by means of the typical cube stimuli. He was accurate in this 
  
 
 
task but showed a non-linear pattern in RTs of angular disparity. According to his debrief, he 
attempted to match individual cubes and angles perceptually before responding, using a 
strategy different from that of the controls (Zeman, Della Sala, Torrens, Gountouna, 
McGonigle, & Logie, 2010). In line with this observation, in the typical MR task (Shepard & 
Metzler, 1971) different brain areas (for more detail, please see Logie, Pernet, Buonocore, & 
Della Sala, 2011) were activated in good and poor imagers, suggesting that they used 
different ways to manipulate their visual representations to solve the task, though no such 
group difference was found on either RTs or slopes in behavioural results (Logie et al., 2011). 
In accordance with this view, our aim in the present experiment was to investigate the 
individual differences in imagery tasks.  This will add to our understanding of the individual 
differences observed in memory, reasoning and learning, especially in spatial problem 
solving ability (Hegarty & Kozhevnikov, 1999; Wai, Lubinski & Benbow, 2009). We 
hypothesised that individuals differing in their imagery abilities may create different formats 
of visual images under different task demands and utilise these multiple visual 
representations to generate different strategies for further mental manipulation. Good and 
poor imagers may not differentiate in processing an integrated object, but would show 
differences in processing objects consisting of several pieces.  
For the purpose of the current study, the stimulus complexity level was manipulated 
in two ways: 1) the cube number in an integrated object; 2) the segment number of the 
stimuli.  Accordingly, good and poor imagers were grouped and assessed with four types of 
stimuli: two Standard and two non-Standard cube objects. We selected Shepard and Metzler’s 
(1971) typical objects (Fig.1a) as the basic Standard stimuli, the same types of stimuli used in 
the studies with MX (Zeman et al., 2010; Logie et al, 2011). The other Standard objects 
  
 
 
comprised a series of eight-cube stimuli (Fig.1b). In non-Standard objects, one set consisted 
of two segments (Fig.1c) and the other set of three segments (Fig.1d).  
The effect of cube number was tested to explore the individual differences in 
processing an integrated object by comparing the two Standard objects (Fig.1a and 1b). If 
participants transformed the object cube by cube, more time would be needed and a steeper 
slope should be observed in RTs in the ten-cube object. If instead a holistic strategy is 
applied, no time difference should be observed between objects and no effect of cube number 
is predicted. According to the behavioural results reported by Logie et al. (2011), we 
predicted that no effect of cube number on the slopes would be found in the Standard 
condition for both good and poor imagers that both of the groups would tend to use holistic 
strategy. This result will be used as a baseline for further analyses of the effect of segment 
number. 
The effect of segment number was analysed to investigate whether individuals differ 
in processing objects consisting of several parts by comparing three types of stimuli: eight-
cube Standard (Fig.1b), two-segment and three-segment non-Standard (Fig.1c and 1d). The 
eight-cube Standard objects served as control for the effect of cube number compared with 
the non-Standard objects which also consisted of eight cubes. If participants used piecemeal 
transformation for the non-Standard objects, they should have slower and less accurate 
performance with these figures than the Standard ones, assuming that the Standard objects 
can be rotated holistically. If a precise internal representation of the non-Standard object was 
generated for MR processing, participants would perform faster and more accurate in these 
objects than the Standard one in which holistic strategy is assumed to be applied. As good 
imagers in the present paper define those who have more vividness, we predicted that they 
  
 
 
will be more flexible in manipulating their visual representations and would represent more 
precise images for more complex stimuli and rotate them more efficiently by showing a 
shallower slope in their RTs. On the other hand, poor imagers might have difficulties in 
representing the whole non-Standard images and would transform the stimuli piece-by-piece 
by showing a steeper slope in their RTs functions in the non-Standard condition. 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-four university students aged 21 to 36 years (average age = 26.2 years; 16 female) 
were recruited for this experiment. All participants were right-handed, with no history of 
neurological disorders and reported having normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants 
were classified as good and poor imagers based on their performance in the Vividness of 
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ-2 Marks, 1999). VVIQ-2 is a standardised 
questionnaire assessing general visual imagery use and experience (Pearson, Deepros, 
Wallace-Hadrill, Heyes & Holmes, 2013), the same visual imagery questionnaire used in 
MX’s series of studies (Zeman et al., 2010; Logie et al, 2011). The VVIQ-2 scores ranged 
from 76 to 144 out of a possible total of 160 (mean=110.72, SD= 17.47) and were normally 
distributed. Based on the VVIQ-2 performance, nine good imagers (top VVIQ-2 score 
quartile, mean= 133.11, SD= 6.21, six men and three women, mean age=24.56 years) and 
nine poor imagers (bottom VVIQ-2 score quartile, mean= 90, SD= 6.38, six men and three 
women, mean age=26.44 years) were selected for further analysis. 
  
 
 
Material  
The stimuli were arm-like stimuli formed of cubes derived from Shepard and Metzler (1971). 
Four types of stimuli were used in the present MR task, two Standard and two non-Standard. 
One set of Standard stimuli (Fig. 1a) was exactly the same as the one used in Shepard and 
Metzler (1971) which consisted of ten cubes. The other set of Standard stimuli (Fig. 2b) 
consisted of eight cubes. Similar to the ‘fragmented’ stimuli in Khooshabeh et al.’s 
experiment (2013), both types of non-Standard stimuli (Fig. 1c and Fig.1d) were devised by 
withdrawing two cubes from the Standard stimuli (Fig. 1a) used in Shepard and Metzler’s 
experiment (1971). The difference between these two non-Standard stimuli was the number 
of segments involved: One set was devised by withdrawing two consecutive cubes from the 
Standard stimuli (Fig. 1c); the other was concocted by removing two non-consecutive cubes 
(Fig. 1d).  
----- Insert Figure 1 about here ----- 
For each type of stimuli, a pair of objects was set as a trial with different angular 
disparity, between 0° and 180° with 20° increments (10 angular disparity), in which half the 
stimuli were rotated along with the picture plane and the others rotated in depth (two axis). 
Within half of the trials, one object was paired with an exactly identical corresponding object 
with a different orientation, whereas the other half was set with its mirrored figure but still 
had a different orientation (two identities). There were 160 trials (4 types of stimuli ×10 
angular disparity × 2 identities × 2 rotate axis = 160 trials) with ten repetitions of each 
stimulus randomly ordered. Accordingly, in total 1600 trials were included in this four-block 
experiment with 400 trials in each block. 
  
 
 
Procedure 
The participants were required to sit in front of a computer with the keyboard all masked 
except for two buttons marked “S” and “D”, indicating “same” and “different” respectively. 
For half of the participants, the “S” button was set on their right hand side and the “D” button 
on their left side. For the other half of the participants, the “S” button was set on their left 
side and the “D” on their right.  
A run-in of 16 trials served as practice allowing participants to familiarise themselves 
with the task. In both the practice and real experiment sessions (see Figure 2), first a black 
screen was presented for 250ms, followed by a fixation cross lasting 1,000ms to 1,200ms 
then a pair of 3D cube stimuli were presented for 6,500ms. Participants had to indicate 
whether these two objects were the same ones (though rotated) or mirror images by pressing 
the “S” or “D” button. During the whole procedure, the participants were asked to keep their 
hands on the keyboard. Each experimental block was followed by a debriefing session, in 
which participants orally reported on the strategy they used in the previous block. 
----- Insert Figure 2 about here ----- 
Data Analysis 
Prior to the analysis, RT data were trimmed for outliers. RTs more than two standard deviations 
above or below the mean per condition and per subject were excluded (3.7% of the data on 
average). The results were analyzed based on the identical trials only, as is typical in studies of 
MR.1 A repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) was applied to the corrected RTs 
                                                 
1. It is typical in MR experiments to analyze the identical trials only, as identical and mirrored image 
discriminations reflect two distinctive cognitive processes (Martinaud et al., 2016). 
  
 
 
as well as accuracy data with one between-subject factor (good or poor imagers) and two 
within-subject factors: types of stimuli with different complexity levels and ten rotation angles. 
When imagery ability was found interacting with types of stimuli or angular disparity, 
independent t-tests would apply to test group difference (good vs. poor imagers). Trend 
analyses would be applied for testing the effect of angular disparity in each condition followed 
by Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons, if angular disparity was observed to interact 
with other factors. 
To test the MR rate under different task demands, we fitted a linear line to each participant’s 
RTs to calculate the slope and intercept of this line. Repeated ANOVA was used for these 
estimated slope and intercept between two imagery ability groups with different stimulus 
complexity levels. Independent t-test would apply to test group differences (good vs. poor 
imagers) in each type of stimuli when the interaction of types of stimuli and imagery ability 
was found. A repeated-measures ANOVAs would again be used for good and poor imagers 
separately followed by the Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons for testing the 
complexity effect in each group. 
 
  
  
 
 
Results 
Effect of Cube Number 
Consistent with previous literature, there was an effect of angular disparity on RTs, F(9, 
144)= 56.582, p< .001, ηp2=.990 as well as on the accuracy, F(9, 144)= 34.426, p<.001, 
ηp2=.683. As expected, both good and poor imagers did not differ in their RTs on the eight-
cube and ten-cube Standard objects, F(1, 16)= .011, p=.918, ηp2=.001, as well as in their 
accuracy, F(1, 16)=.092, p=.765, ηp2=.006. Moreover, both good and poor imagers did not 
differ in MR rate in processing these two Standard objects, F(1, 16)=.046, p=.834, suggesting 
that both good and poor imagers did not transform the objects cube-by-cube and may instead 
have applied an holistic strategy in the Standard conditions.  
Effect of Segment Number 
Response Times 
Figure 3 details the RTs in all three conditions for both good and poor imagers as a function 
of angular disparity. As predicted, there was an interaction between imagery ability and types 
of stimuli, F(2, 32)= 8.378, p=.001, ηp2=.344. Group difference was analysed separately in 
different types of stimuli and indicated that good and poor imagers did not differ in the 
Standard stimuli, t(16)= .680, p= .506, but differed in the two-segment non-Standard object, 
t(16)= -2.228, p=.041 and the three-segment, t(16)=-3.218, p=.005. In processing the non-
Standard objects, poor imagers spent much more time (two-segment= 3082.79ms, SD= 
665.41; three-segment= 3982.05ms, SD= 801.55) than good imagers (two-
segment=2473.76ms, SD= 479.42; three-segment=2892.15ms, SD= 624.38). 
As revealed by previous studies, a main effect of rotation angle was observed on RTs 
  
 
 
for all the types of stimuli, F(9, 144) = 131.569, p<.001, ηp2=.892, which confirmed a linear 
trend, F(1, 16)= 442.540, p<.001, ηp2=965. The angular disparity effect was also different in 
good and poor imagers, F(9, 144)= 4.970, p<.001, ηp2=.237. For good imagers, RTs linearly 
increased with the increasing rotation angle, F(1, 8)= 98.4   89, p<.001, whereas poor 
imagers’ RTs fit for both linear, F(1, 8)= 351.600, p<.001, ηp2=.978, and quadratic trends, 
F(1, 8)= 11.117, p=.01, ηp2=.582, though angular disparity effect was observed in both good, 
F(9, 72)=29.536, p<.001, ηp2=.787, and poor imagers, F(9, 72)= 33.288, p<.001, ηp2=.806. 
For poor imagers, RTs were irrelevant to angular disparity in larger rotation angles, raising 
slightly from 100° (mean= 4202.60ms, SD= 4783.87) to 180° (mean= 4783.87), which were 
not statistically significant between each of the two consecutive angles, 100°-120° (p=1.000), 
120°-140° (p=1.000), 140°-160° (p=1.000) and 160°-180° (p=1.000). This quadratic-pattern 
of RTs in poor imagers in the present experiment is consistent with what Logie et al. (2011) 
found in their poor imagers’ performance as well as with the data from case MX reported by 
Zeman et al.’s (2010). These findings suggested that poor imagers might be impaired in 
maintaining the quality of their representation for larger rotation angles, which has been 
proposed by Mumaw et al. (1984) before.  
----- Insert Figure 3 about here ----- 
Accuracy 
As depicted in Figure 4, accuracy rate decreased with the angular disparity, F(9, 144) = 
43.658, p<.001, ηp2=.732. Angular disparity effect on the accuracy was also observed in 
differences between good and poor imagers, F(9, 144)= 5.006, p<.001, ηp2=.238, which 
confirmed a linear trend in both good, F(1, 8)= 17.808, p=.003, ηp2=.690 and poor imagers, 
F(1,8)= 270.330, p=.003 and <.001, ηp2=.971. Independent t-tests were applied separately for 
  
 
 
different angular disparity and we found that poor imagers performed worse than good 
imagers in larger rotation angles, larger than 100°, which was statistically significantly 
different at 120°(p=.036), 140°(p<.001), 160°(p=.016) and 180°(p=.023). As shown in the 
right panel of Figure 4, the accuracy rate of poor imagers reached the chance level in larger 
rotation angles, suggesting that they might have difficulty in mental manipulation for larger 
angles.  
A main effect of segment number was also observed on accuracy rate, F(2, 32) = 
5.249, p=.011, ηp2=.239. Participants performed more accurately in the two-segment non-
Standard objects (mean= 86.6%, SD=9.04) than the Standard (mean= 77.0%, SD= 11.2) and 
three-segment non-Standard ones (mean= 81.9%, SD= 11.9). However, unexpectedly, good 
and poor imagers did not differ in these different types of stimuli, F(2, 32)=2.432, p=.104, 
ηp2=.132. 
----- Insert Figure 4 about here ----- 
Slope and Intercept 
The most direct test of the predictions outlined above is based on estimates of MR rate (reverse 
of the slope in RTs). Group difference (good and poor imagers) was found on the slope measure, 
F(1, 16)= 5.273, p=.036, ηp2=.248, showing that good imagers (mean= 14.506ms/degree, SD= 
4.14) processed the stimuli significantly faster than poor imagers (mean= 18.052ms/degree, 
SD= 2.85).  
As expected, an interaction between imagery ability and types of stimuli was also found 
in the slope measure, F(2, 32)= 25.447, p<.001, ηp2=.614. Good and poor imagers did not 
differentiate in processing the Standard objects (good imagers= 18.165ms/degree, SD= 4.75; 
  
 
 
poor imagers= 14.350ms/degree, SD= 3.10), t(16)= 2.016, p=.258, but showed the group 
difference in both two-segment, t(16)= -3.909, p=.001, and three-segment non-Standard 
objects processing, t(16)= -3.957, p=.001. Good imagers performed much faster (two-
segment= 11.99ms/degree, SD= 3.63; three-segment= 13.36ms/degree, SD= 4.04) than poor 
imagers (two-segment= 19.62ms/degree, SD= 4.59; three-segment= 20.18ms/degree, SD= 
3.23) in these non-Standard objects.  
A repeated-measures ANOVA was applied to the good imagers only and the main 
effect of types of stimuli was found on the slope measure of the RTs of angular disparity, 
F(2, 16)= 15.794, p<.001, ηp2=.664. As depicted in the left panel of Figure 5, a shallower 
RTs slope was observed in both two-segment and three-segment non-Standard conditions 
than the Standard one. Post-hoc analyses with the Bonferroni correction indicated that the 
MR rate in processing the Standard objects (mean= 18.165ms/degree, SD= 4.75) was much 
slower for good imagers than that in two-segment and three-segment objects; this difference 
was statistically significant, in both cases at p=.007. However, in processing the non-
Standard objects, good imagers performed similarly in the two-segment (mean= 
11.990ms/degree, SD= 3.63) and three-segment (mean= 13.363ms/degree, SD= 4.04), 
p=.493. This shallower-pattern slope is consistent with Yeille and Steiger’s (1982) findings, 
suggesting that good imagers might generated more precise representation for the non-
Standard object and used it for MR processing.  
A repeated-measures ANOVA was also applied for poor imagers. As expected, the 
main effect of types of stimuli was found on slope for poor imagers as well, F(2,16)= 11.045, 
p<.001, ηp2=.580. Post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed that poor imagers 
processed the two-segment (mean= 19.62ms/degree, SD= 4.60) and three-segment objects 
  
 
 
(mean= 20.18ms/degree, SD= 3.23) at a similar MR rate, p=1.000. However, in contrast to 
good imagers, as depicted in the right panel of Figure 5, a steeper RTs slope was shown in 
both two-segment and three-segment objects than the Standard one. Poor imagers performed 
much faster in Standard objects (mean= 14.35ms/degree, SD= 3.10) than in two-segment and 
three-segment non-Standard objects; this difference was reliable for two-segment (p=.031) 
and three-segment objects (p=.001). This slower performance in non-Standard objects is 
consistent with our prediction suggesting that poor imagers use piecemeal transformation 
instead of holistic strategy in processing the multi-part objects.  
----- Insert Figure 5 about here ----- 
A main effect of segment number was observed on the intercept measure, F(2, 32)= 
9.187, p=.001, ηp2=.365. Participants took significantly less time in encoding the two-
segment stimuli (mean= 1300.803ms, SD= 505.56) than the three-segment objects 
(mean=1927.432ms, SD= 649.01) and the Standard ones (mean= 1968.007ms, SD= 648.96), 
p=.011 and .002 respectively. However, the segment number effect was no different between 
good and poor imagers, F(2, 32)=.939, p=.402, ηp2=.055, nor the group difference on this 
intercept measurement, F(1, 16)=1.004, p=.331, ηp2=.059. 
 
  
 
 
 
Discussion 
By manipulating the complexity of the stimuli, we tested and specified individual differences 
with regard to visual imagery capacities on performing the MR task with one integrated 
object (Standard condition) and objects consisting of several segments (non-Standard 
condition). Good and poor imagers, defined according to their vividness of visual 
representations, performed similarly in the Standard objects and showed no cube number 
effect on either their RTs or estimated slope measure. However, good and poor imagers 
differed in processing the multi-part non-Standard objects. Compared with the eight-cube 
Standard object, good imagers performed faster in non-Standard ones whereas poor imagers 
obtained the opposite pattern of performance.   
Consistent with Logie et al.’s behavioral results (2011), in the Standard condition, no 
effect of cube number was observed on either RTs or slope measure in either the good or the 
poor imagers. This suggests that the same strategy was adopted by both groups and that they 
did not transform the Standard objects cube-by-cube.  
A different pattern emerged from the analyses of the processing of the multi-part non-
Standard objects. Here the good and poor imagers’ performance differed; various 
representation formats and various strategies were observed across individuals. Good imagers 
performed faster in non-Standard objects than in the Standard ones. This finding confirmed 
Yuille et al.’s (1982) precise representation transformation account which maintains that 
participants could generate a partial image of the stimuli in their mind’s eye and rotate it to 
complete the MR task. Alternatively, Liesefeld and Zimmer (2013) postulated that only 
  
 
 
comparison-relevant information was maintained for further holistic MR processing. Here we 
can not detail the content of the simplified representation but further specify that only good 
imagers were able to apply this precise transformation in MR tasks.  
Poor imagers, on the other hand, showed a steeper slope in RTs in non-Standard objects, 
suggesting that they used piecemeal transformation to process the fragmented objects. This 
finding is consistent with the claims that poor imagers have difficulty in rotating the more 
complex object holistically (Mumaw et al., 1984). Poor imagers might have difficulty encoding 
the multi-part non-Standard objects as a unit in their mind’s eye. They instead may attempt to 
encode the non-Standard stimuli as one part attached to another. Given the limitations of our 
visual system capacity so that only one additional part/information could be maintained 
attached to another part (Xu & Franconeri, 2015), they might fail to represent the stimuli with 
multiple parts and have to transform the individual parts separately.  
It is notable that poor imagers processed the two-segment and three-segment non-
Standard objects at a similar rate. This seems to question the piecemeal transformation account 
in which more time would be needed for transforming the additional segment in three-segment 
objects and a steeper slope would be observed in the RT in these objects. One possibility is that 
poor imagers attempted to use piecemeal transformation for the non-Standard objects but failed 
under time constraint to transform the additional piece in the three-segment objects for larger 
angles. This account is supported by their low accuracy and angle-irrelevant RTs in larger 
rotation angles.  
In sum, at odds with the simple dichotomies object/spatial or visualizer/verbalizer 
(Paivio, 1971; Kozhevnikov et al., 2005), the findings from our present experiment support 
Pearson and Kosslyn’s recent argument (2015) that multiple formats of representation could 
  
 
 
be created and those representations could be flexibly used in further mental manipulations. 
We specified the format of representation and strategy selection under different tasks across 
individuals; we observed that there was no individual difference in processing integrated 
objects, whereas in processing fragmented objects, multiple formats of representations and 
multiple strategies could be generated across individuals with different levels of visual imagery 
ability. Good imagers are more flexible in generating different formats of representation and 
particularly in processing more complex objects and they could maintain a precise 
representation of the stimuli in their mind’s eye for further mental manipulations; poor imagers 
instead rely more on piecemeal transformation in processing multi-part objects.  
Mumaw et al. (1984) speculated that the individual differences in MR across high and 
low-spatial ability individuals is due to their different representational skills. That is to say, 
good imagers are expected to perform similar to high-spatial ability individuals in MR; poor 
imagers would perform similar to low-spatial ability individuals. However, the present findings 
in individual differences in MR with regard to their imagery vividness are not fully consistent 
with those from previous studies considering spatial ability (Khooshabeh et al., 2013). 
Khooshabeh et al.’s (2013) posited that in processing the integrated Standard objects the default 
strategy of low-spatial ability individuals is piecemeal transformation, whereas in the present 
experiment, poor imagers use a holistic approach. In multi-part non-Standard conditions, 
Khooshabeh et al.’s (2013) found that high-spatial ability individuals would use piecemeal 
transformation, whereas we found good imagers still use holistic but they represent a simplified 
version of the stimulus. Therefore, we could not support Mumaw et al.’s (1984) speculated 
correspondence between high/low spatial ability and good/poor representation skills. The 
representational skill is key to spatial ability, but to better specify in which specific way high 
  
 
 
and low-spatial ability individuals differed in MR tasks, it would be possible in future studies 
to control for the participants’ ability in working memory as well.  
In addition, here we confirmed that it is easier to induce participants to use non-holistic 
strategies in the non-Standard condition by changing the number of perceptually distinct pieces 
rather than by merely changing the number of components within an integrated Standard object 
(see also Bethell-Fox & Shepard, 1988; Podgorny & Shepard, 1983). Therefore, it is possible 
that the holistic strategy was at play in some studies (e.g., Cooper, 1975; Cooper & Podgorny, 
1976) in which the complexity of stimuli was manipulated within one integrated object. 
Moreover, the present results show that individual differences should be considered in future 
studies on the role of stimulus complexity in MR even if complexity is manipulated by 
changing the number of perceptually distinct pieces. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: The four types of stimuli used in the present experiment. Fig.1a and Fig.1b 
examples of the two Standard stimuli. One is the typical ten-cube object (Fig.1a) whereas the 
other is composed of eight cubes (Fig.1b). Fig.1c and Fig.1d examples of the two non-
Standard stimuli designed by withdrawing two cubes from the Standard stimuli. One set was 
designed by withdrawing two consecutive cubes (Fig.1c), whereas the other set (Fig.1d) was 
designed by withdrawing two non-consecutive cubes. 
Figure 2: The experiment procedure. 
Figure 3: RTs as a function of angular disparity in processing the Standard stimuli as well as 
the two non-Standard stimuli. The left plot reports the RTs functions for good imagers; the 
right plot is the RT functions for poor imagers. 
Figure 4: The accuracy rate across the rotation angle from 0° to 180° in processing the 
Standard stimuli as well as the two non-Standard stimuli. The left panel reports accuracy rate 
across all the rotation angles for good imagers; the right panel is the accuracy rate for the 
poor imagers. 
Figure 5: The MR rate (slope) for good imagers (left-side panel) and poor imagers (right side 
panel). 
 
